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QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION FROM A RANDOM SEED
Eduin H. SERNA∗
Quantum Technology Laboratory, ADAPTUN SAS,
Carrera 69A No. 44A-36 Torre 3 Int 502, Medell´ın, Colombia
It is designed a new quantum cryptography protocol that generates various secret and secure keys
of the same size of the transmitted qubits, implying zero information losses between the interlocutors.
Besides, generates key swapping between the two recipients of photons, without even sharing a past
between them. This protocol differs from BB84 just in the classic procedures, using a random seed
and asymmetric cryptography.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult practical problems when con-
ducting secure communication is the key distribution.
Shannon in 1949 [1], established that if the key, is ran-
dom, has the same length of the message to code and is
used one time only, then it is guaranteed statistical inde-
pendence of the cryptogram with respect to the message.
In fact, it is the only system demonstrated to be math-
ematically secure. However, the need to distribute and
store securely the keys, generally long and just for one
use, limits its implementation. This panorama remained
the same until 1984, year in which Bennett and Bras-
sard presented the first quantum key distribution proto-
col (QKD), called BB84 [2]. This protocol is that the
interlocutors (Alice, Bob) transmit the key through a
quantum channel. The quantum contribution to the se-
curity of the process is that an eavesdropper cannot ex-
tract information without revealing its presence to the
interlocutors.
Essentially the QKD protocols BB84 , B92 [3], E91
[4] and SARG04 [5] apply two processes: - Raw key
exchange, obtained from the initial interpretation of the
quantum states exchanged between Alice and Bob. -
Public Reconciliation, where, Alice and Bob obtain the
secret key from the published information. Thus, QKD
is the only method physically secure to exchange secret
keys [6].
In this article it is presented a new protocol that is
identical to the BB84 for all the quantum manipulations,
but differs from it by using Private Reconciliation from
a Random Seed and Asymmetric Cryptography. Thus
allowing the generation of larger secure keys.
This article is designed as follows: Sec II presents the
formalism of the BB84 protocol, Sec III present the new
protocol and its differences from the BB84 and Sec IV
contains the conclusions.
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II. BB84 PROTOCOL
A. Quantum Part
Alice and Bob exchange a set of encoded photons
according to four states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉, which gather
forming two basis with orthogonal states B0 = {|0〉, |1〉}
and B1 = {|+〉, |−〉}, where |±〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉).Coding
the binary value 0 to the states |0〉 and |+〉, and the
binary value 1 to the states |1〉 and |−〉. For simplicity
it is denoted |ψ00〉 ≡ |0〉, |ψ01〉 ≡ |1〉, |ψ10〉 ≡ |+〉,
|ψ11〉 ≡ |−〉.
• Raw Key Exchange
– Alice generates two random strings with the
same length, N , The strings will correspond
to the keys Alice wants to share with Bob,
one of binary basis s1s2 . . . sN and the other
of binary values i1i2 . . . iN . From the ele-
ments occupying the concrete position, k, in
both strings, Alice obtains the associated state
|ψskik〉 and sends it to Bob through a quantum
channel.
– Bob generates a random string of binary ba-
sis m1m2 . . .mN that will correspond to the
key it wants to share with Alice. Bob mea-
sures each received state |ψskik〉 in the corre-
sponding base Bmk , obtaining a binary string
a1a2...aN .
B. Classic Part
Alice and Bob exchange a set of binary strings.
• Public Reconciliation
– Bob sends to Alice the sequence of basis
m1m2 . . .mN , through an public channel au-
thenticated.
– Alice compares the strings s1s2 . . . sN and
m1m2 . . .mN , sending to Bob the binary se-
quence l1l2 . . . lN with lk = sk ⊕mk.
2– Alice and Bob share now a sequence of binary
values ik = ak formed by lk = 0.
An example of the BB84 is given in the Table 1. In
perfect conditions Alice and Bob share and generate an
identical random key.
III. NEW PROTOCOL
A. Quantum Part
• Raw Key Exchange - BB84
• Random seed
– Alice or Bob publish a random binary string
x1x2 . . . xN .
• Missing Key Exchange
– Alice sums sk ⊕ xk, k = 1, 2, ..., N. Obtaining
a sequence of binary basis t1t2 . . . tN and gen-
erates other random string of binary values
j1j2 . . . jN that will correspond to other key
that it wants to exchange with Bob. From the
elements occupying a concrete position, k, of
the preceding strings, Alice obtains the associ-
ated state |ψtkjk〉 and sends it to Bob through
a quantum channel.
– Bob sums (1 ⊕mk) ⊕ xk, k = 1, 2, ..., N. Ob-
taining the string of binary basis n1n2 . . . nN
and measures each received state |ψtkjk〉 with
the corresponding base Bnk generating the
string b1b2 . . . bN .
B. Classic Part
Alice and Bob exchange a set of binary strings and
apply in different binary arrangements the function f
defined as follows:
f(z, x, y) :=
{
x, z = 0
y, z = 1
• Asymmetric Cryptography
– Alice sums ik ⊕ jk, k = 1, 2, ..., N. Obtain-
ing the binary string y1y2 . . . yN that sends to
Bob.
– Bob encrypt mk in uk and vk with
uk = nk ⊕ f(mk, ak, bk ⊕ yk),
vk = nk ⊕ f(mk, bk, ak ⊕ yk).
k = 1, 2, ..., N. Obtaining the public strings
u1u2 . . . uN y v1v2 . . . vN that sends to Alice.
1a: s ≡ keys 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2a: i ≡ keyi 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
3a: |ψsi〉 |ψ10〉 |ψ01〉 |ψ11〉 |ψ00〉 |ψ01〉 |ψ01〉 |ψ00〉 |ψ00〉
1b: m ≡ keym 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
2b: Bm B0 B1 B1 B0 B0 B1 B1 B0
3b: a ∗ ∗ 1 0 1 ∗ ∗ 0
4a BB84: l 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
BB84: key 1 0 1 0
4ab: x 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
5a: t 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
6a: j ≡ keyj 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
7a: |ψtj〉 |ψ01〉 |ψ10〉 |ψ11〉 |ψ00〉 |ψ01〉 |ψ10〉 |ψ10〉 |ψ01〉
5b: n 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
6b: Bn B0 B1 B0 B1 B1 B1 B1 B1
7b: b 1 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 ∗
8a: y 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
8b: u ∗ 0 ∗ 1 0 0 1 1
9b: v 1 ∗ 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
9a: keym 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
10a: l 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
10b: keys 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
11b: keyi 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
12b: keyj 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
TABLE I: The Proposed Protocol from Alice (a) to Bob (b),
N = 8. The steps 1a-3a and 1b-3b are equal to BB84. Where
∗ ∈ {0, 1}, t = s⊕x, n = 1⊕x⊕m, y = i⊕j, u = n⊕f(m,a, b⊕
y), v = n⊕f(m, b, a⊕y), keym ≡ t⊕f(s, (1⊕i)⊕u, j⊕v), l =
s⊕m, keys ≡ m⊕ l, keyi ≡ f(l, a, b⊕y), y keyj ≡ f(l, a⊕y, b).
– Alice sums
tk ⊕ f(sk, (1⊕ ik)⊕ uk, jk ⊕ vk)
Decrypting mk for k = 1, 2, ..., N. Obtaining
the private string m1m2 . . .mN of Bob.
• Private Reconciliation
– Alice compares the strings s1s2 . . . sN and
m1m2 . . .mN , sending to Bob the binary se-
quence l1l2 . . . lN with lk = sk ⊕mk.
– Bob sums mk ⊕ lk, k = 1, 2, ..., N. Obtaining
the private string s1s2 . . . sN of Alice and ap-
ply:
f(lk, ak, bk ⊕ yk) ≡ ik
f(lk, ak ⊕ yk, bk) ≡ jk,
k = 1, 2, ..., N. Obtaining the private strings
of Alice i1i2 . . . iN , y j1j2 . . . jN .
3An example of this protocol is given in Table 1.
In perfect conditions Alice and Bob share four se-
cret and secure keys with length N, m1m2 . . .mN ,
s1s2 . . . sN , i1i2 . . . iN , y j1j2 . . . jN .
C. Quantum Key Swapping
If Central is an emitting source of photons of BB84,
B92 or E91, Alice and Bob are recipients of these pho-
tons. And following the steps of the previous protocol,
both generate a common key without even sharing a past
between them, due that Central compares the sequences
mAlice and mBob in the Private Reconciliation and in-
forms in which they coincided. Besides, If Central used
the same encoded states in Raw and Missing key Ex-
change for Alice and Bob, they share the private strings
of Central.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, It has been demonstrated that using a
random seed over a set of photons and asymmetric cryp-
tography over the encoded bits, the QKD becomes a pro-
cess of zero information losses, where the percentage of
coincidence of the reconciliated key against the size of the
raw key is 100% unlike the BB84 in which the expected is
50%. Besides, this protocol as the SARG04 is identical to
the BB84 for all the quantum manipulations and differs
only in the classic procedure. Thus, this protocol can be
implemented in existing devices without modifications.
[1] C. E. Shannon, Bell System Technical Journal.vol. 28
pp.656-715. (1949).
[2] CC.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Proceedings of IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal
Processing, 175 (1984).
[3] Ch.H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[4] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[5] V. Scarani, A. Ac´ın, G. Ribordy, N. Gisin, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 92, 057901 (2004).
[6] N. Gisin et al., Rev. Mod. Phys 74, 145 (2002).
